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Trump’s Strategic Blunder in Calling Putin and Xi “My Friends

During the APEC summit leading up to the trilateral meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump, the U.S. president called his Chinese and Russian counterparts “my friends.” In a highly symbolic summit…

Trump’s Strategic Blunder in Calling Putin and Xi “My Friends

During the APEC summit leading up to the trilateral meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump, the U.S. president called his Chinese and Russian counterparts “my friends.” In a highly symbolic summit, this represents a strategic blunder.

The much-hyped trilateral meeting between Trump, Xi, and Putin has happened. There is not a lot to take away in terms of actual policy. The three leaders did not speak to the press afterwards, and we will probably never know what was said or agreed upon in private. It is my experience reporting on other international summits that the most interesting things happen behind closed doors; what happens in front of the camera is mostly theatre.

However, that theatre is not meaningless. World leaders know that it is as important to seem like one as to be one. Therefore, the optics of what is presented become a symbolically charged text that commentators rip apart in order to try to understand what was not reported. The joint declaration of the trilateral meeting is one of those theatrical pieces.

It is, of course, very abstract and carries no concrete application, but the themes touched upon are significant. Since this one is rather short, I will copy it here before doing what commentators do:

1. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China, Russia, and the United States committed to reform the U.N. so that the U.N. can respond more effectively to global challenges and conform to its fundamental mission of international peace and security.

2. The three countries plan to increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products for the benefit of all nations. They reaffirmed the importance of stable energy flows.

3. The three heads of state recognized that the principle of state consent and respect for immunities of state officials are of paramount importance, and concurred that the International Criminal Court and other similar bodies must not abuse their jurisdiction.

4. The three heads of state reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The three countries will conduct a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I would say that the first point was proposed by China. China is an internationalist country. It needs a stable order so that it can trade and sell things to others; it is the basis of its economy. The U.N., although mostly ineffective, is seen as the best existing institution to serve that purpose. If reformed to lessen the weight of the West in it, it could be a useful instrument. That has been a constant call from the BRICS summits: not to abolish it, but to reform it.

The second point, I would think, was proposed by Russia. The U.S. is already almost at maximum production capacity (excluding Venezuela…) and China is not an oil-producing country. Russia is the one that stands to symbolically benefit the most from it. This could also hold significance for Iran and could indicate that Trump, despite some factions of his administration, does not want more war. That does not mean that there will be no more war.

And the third point was probably proposed by the U.S. (maybe with some Zionist input). The only one of the three leaders who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court is Putin, but he has not shown much concern about it. Trump, however, seems to have a fixation on it. Not only because it has pursued Netanyahu and other Israeli politicians, but because to him, it symbolizes the apex of a supranational entity responding to the desires of a “globalist elite.”

The fourth point, I believe, was thrown in mostly as filler. Xi refused to hold talks about reducing nuclear armament, as China has significantly fewer weapons than Russia and the U.S. (What would more be necessary for, if with a tiny fraction we are all dead?). Perhaps this point serves to disguise the individual interests of each country in the joint declaration and to give the impression of a common understanding.

Alexander Dugin, of course, argues that the trilateral summit represents a reluctant, symbolic recognition of an emerging multipolar world by a weakened United States. Judging by the joint statement, this would not seem like a far-fetched idea, though perhaps not in the manner that he would like.

Similar to Dugin, I believe this statement is an indication that the current U.S. administration has understood that it needs to recognize China and Russia as equal interlocutors in world politics. However, not in the multipolar way that Dugin would like, because perhaps not even Russia and China want that.

The Russian philosopher proposes a world of “civilizational poles.” That is, a world in which territory is distributed in accordance with different traditional civilizations—Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Hindu, etc. For that, he proposes a type of traditionalist nationalism. That means a nation based on a particular understanding of a sacred tradition (see, for example, his book The Fourth Political Theory). He usually rails against modernity, capitalism, and materialism.

What Xi and Putin represent is a more pragmatic approach. They are not interested in changing the system—the world system; rather, they are interested in changing the world order. I have written before about this distinction. According to this formulation, the world system has three pillars: the fiat-based financial system, the nation-state, and the use of oil as the main energy source (China is trying to change the last one). Every nation in the world functions according to these three pillars. Soon, but not yet (because it is not implemented worldwide), we might have to include total surveillance and CBDCs.

The world order, on the other hand, consists of the political arrangements, or lack thereof, that emerge from those who control these pillars in their different manifestations. The U.S. government, for example, is one manifestation of the nation-state, but those who control the state, the financial system, and the oil are not always the same people, which creates internal conflict. Currently, in China and Russia, those who control the state also control most of the financial system, oil, and other energy resources, which gives them an edge over the U.S.

Despite his apparent radicalism, Dugin does not want to change the world system, only reshape the world order. But he wants a break with the previous one; he speaks about Putin symbolically as “king” (however, if his proposal of a civilizational state based on a sacred tradition were to be taken seriously, it would imply changing the world system, at least in those traditions that forbid usury). Xi and Putin also want to change the world order, but in different ways. They want a continuation of the previous and current order from which they emerged.

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, despite some Western propositions, are not totalitarian rulers. Rather, they sit at the apex of a state system of which they are a part. They function within the system, and they are very careful to appear—especially to their own national audiences—to do so. That is because their legitimacy is not derived from the electoral process, but precisely because they represent their nation-state system, which citizens must feel they are part of. Hence the implacable persecution of anyone, especially at a high bureaucratic level, who tries to trick or profit illegitimately from the system. It’s not only a threat to their power; it is a threat to their legitimacy if they allow it.

Xi and Putin cannot have friends—not in public, at least. To have a friend is to have a preference. As state leaders, they cannot show that preference. Note how carefully hidden their private lives are, unlike Trump and his family. That is because Trump does not represent a state tradition; he represents a class. He is part of the oligarchic financial and industrial elite that has governed the U.S. over the last century. Now the technological elite is also publicly claiming their space, hence J.D. Vance.

The difference between being the representative of an oligarchic class and that of a state structure is that the one who represents the oligarchy will look out for his own interests and those of his class, while the one who represents the state structure must look out for those of the state, and their legitimacy is based on it functioning. They are both part of an elite, but they serve different interests.

When Trump calls Putin and Xi his “friends,” what he is revealing is that they have different conceptions of the state. He can have friends; they can’t.

Source: Naked Capitalism — Finance and Economics ↗

Figures reflect the source report and its stated period. This article is for information and is not investment advice.